As the leader of Wagner retreats into exile following a failed mutiny against Vladimir Putin and his generals, the future of the mercenary group’s operations beyond the few African countries that have welcomed them appears bleak.
After Yevgeny Prizozhin led his mercenary troops in a march on Moscow one week ago, the Wagner boss was sent into exile in Belarus and his group will be wound up. But that leaves a big question: What next for the thousands of Wagner mercenaries dotted around the African continent?
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Since 2018, Prigozhin has marched thousands of his hired guns into Mali, the Central African Republic (CAR), Sudan, and Libya, swapping a vague commitment to help tackle insurgents for access to natural resources. The group has found particular success in Mali and CAR – countries that have in recent years kicked out their former French colonisers in frustration at what they consider to be France’s constant meddling in local affairs.
An alliance with Wagner has certainly come at a cost, too. Its presence in Mali has helped prop up a military junta, while multiple investigations have accused the group of committing human rights abuses that have seen hundreds of civilians killed as part of so-called anti-militant operations. In January, the United Nations called for “authorities in Mali to launch an immediate probe into the mass execution of civilians.”
“We are particularly worried by credible reports that over the course of several days in late March 2022, Malian armed forces accompanied by military personnel believed to belong to the Wagner Group, executed several hundred people, who had been rounded up in Moura, a village in central Mali,” the organisation said, after hearing from locals who claimed that Wagner had been responsible for a “climate of terror and complete impunity.”
With its leader in exile and Putin announcing Russia will integrate Wagner troops into its regular armed forces, a post-mutiny dissolution of Wagner could bring more stability to the region.
“Wagner is not so much a security partner as a regime protector,” Joseph Siegle, the director of research at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a US Department of Defense institution, told VICE News. “That is, it is there to keep those regimes in power – and thereby enhance Russian influence and plunder. Wagner is not in these countries to protect citizens or to bring stability. In both places, instability and human rights abuses have increased since Wagner deployments.”
In response to the mutiny, the US government this week attempted to weaken Wagner further by implementing sanctions against companies and individuals in CAR that they claim “have engaged in illicit gold dealings to fund the Wagner Group to sustain and expand its armed forces, including in Ukraine and Africa, while the targeted individual has been central to activities of Wagner Group units in Mali.”
Russia has said it won’t go from the continent quietly. On Monday, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov promised Russia will stay to help ensure “the safety of the leadership” of those countries. The Kremlin attempted to back up Lavrov’s assurances by sending a slew of diplomats from Russia’s Ministry of Emergency Situations to meet with their counterparts in Mali to promise them that their mercenaries would continue to be available to them. But this all comes as two of Russia’s most senior generals – the armed forces chief of staff, Valery Gerasimov, and the deputy commander of Russian forces in Ukraine, General Sergei Surovikin – have disappeared from public view, leaving the future leadership of the country’s military uncertain.
Additionally, a BBC report on Friday found that Wagner was still actively recruiting men to fight in Russia’s war in Ukraine, despite the promise that it would be wound down. More than a dozen recruitment offices across the country told the network that it was still signing people up directly to Wagner, not the Russian armed forces.
Some experts believe Prigozhin might still have some leverage if he attempts to convince Moscow to allow him to pass some of his time in exile running operations.
“Wagner has been the key lever of Russian influence in Africa, combining the deployment of paramilitary forces, disinformation, election interference, and resource deals to prop up isolated and unpopular African regimes,” Siegle added. “This has rapidly expanded Russian influence in Africa at little or no cost to Moscow.”
In the end, the choice isn’t Russia’s. Authorities in Mali and the CAR must decide whether to go it alone, maintain their alliance with Wagner, or find new partners among Russia’s adversaries. Western countries are certainly ready to make their case for a closer relationship. “Any US or Western security engagement is going to be different,” Siegle said. “It is going to be about protecting citizens, working with the UN, working with regional bodies, and about strengthening more capable, accountable, and transparent security institutions within these countries.”
CAR might not find it less easy to switch partners. According to Samual Ramani, an associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies, CAR will find it more difficult to remove Wagner from the country. This is because the group’s relationship represents a more “comprehensive form of state capture,” where Wagner is far more integrated in government operations, including providing security for President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. “It would be hard to shift that dynamic,” Ramani said.
This might be why people close to the government expect little to change. “Everything is perfect in Bangui, no changes,” a source close to the operation there told VICE News on condition of anonymity.
In Mali, the relationship is more transactional. “Without the steady supply of arms, it’s hard to see how that relationship continues,” Ramani said. “Either way, whether they can stay in Mali and CAR, Wagner probably won’t be picking up any new clients.”
